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Abstract 
Declarative memory is thought to consist of two independent systems: episodic and semantic. 
Episodic memory represents personal and contextually unique events, while semantic memory 
represents culturally-shared, acontextual factual knowledge. Personal semantics refers to aspects 
of declarative memory that appear to fall somewhere in between the extremes of episodic and 
semantic. Examples include autobiographical knowledge and memories of repeated personal 
events. These two aspects of personal semantics have been studied little and rarely compared to 
both semantic and episodic memory. We recorded the event-related potentials (ERPs) of 27 
healthy participants while they verified the veracity of sentences probing four types of questions: 
general (i.e., semantic) facts, autobiographical facts, repeated events, and unique (i.e., episodic) 
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events. Behavioral results showed equivalent reaction times in all 4 conditions. True sentences 
were verified faster than false sentences, except for unique events for which no significant 
difference was observed. Electrophysiological results showed that the N400 (which is classically 
associated with retrieval from semantic memory) was maximal for general facts and the LPC 
(which is classically associated with retrieval from episodic memory) was maximal for unique 
events. For both ERP components, the two personal semantic conditions (i.e., autobiographical 
facts and repeated events) systematically differed from semantic memory. In addition, N400 
amplitudes also differentiated autobiographical facts from unique events. Autobiographical facts 
and repeated events did not differ significantly from each other but their corresponding scalp 
distributions differed from those associated with general facts. Our results suggest that the neural 
correlates of personal semantics can be distinguished from those of semantic and episodic 
memory, and may provide clues as to how unique events are transformed to semantic memory. 
Keywords: Personal semantic memory, Autobiographical facts, Repeated events, Episodic 
memory, Semantic memory, Autobiographical Memory, ERPs, N400, LPC.   
 
Dedication: 
Shlomo was a close friend, even more than a colleague. Our friendship was bashert, a Yiddish 
term that is associated with meeting your soul-mate and life-partner, though I see no reason why 
it can’t be extended to friends. We were born about a year apart, I, in 1945, Shlomo, in 1946, in 
Bucharest. I lived in Ramleh, Israel, as a child, but it took until 1978 for us to meet. I was on my 
first sabbatical which I chose to spend in Jerusalem, and Shlomo was working on his PhD, while 
running (unofficially) the EEG laboratory at Hadassah Hospital where I was assigned an office. 
 3 
 
We liked and respected each other from the beginning, and we, and our families, grew close to 
each other, and remain so to this day. Though I was more advanced nominally in my career, it 
was clear to me that Shlomo surpassed me in knowledge and technical skill, an advantage he 
never relinquished. He was an indefatigable worker, a generous collaborator and a selfless, 
caring and wise mentor whose scientific contributions, and those he fostered in his colleagues 
and trainees, have advanced our field greatly. In recognition of his achievements, he was 
awarded the Israel Prize in 2012, which delighted and gratified him.  
 To celebrate his receiving the Israel Prize, Shlomo invited me to give a special lecture in 
November at the 20
th
 Anniversary of the Interdisciplinary Center for Neural Computation to 
commemorate his receiving the Israel Prize. In preparing that lecture, I thought it would be 
appropriate to present the results of a study that used ERPs, a measure that Shlomo began using 
when I first met him, and that figured prominently in his research throughout his life. Tragically, 
on July 13, just as his sabbatical year at Berkeley was ending, he was killed there in a vehicular 
accident while he was riding his bicycle safely. What was to be a celebratory event, turned into a 
Memorial Lecture. I reminisced about his life, and presented data from an ERP study in which, 
fittingly, I was a junior collaborator, as I had been in the ERP studies I published with Shlomo. 
The present paper, a follow-up to that study (Renoult, Davidson et al, 2015), can be considered 
an addendum to that lecture, and a means for continuing my relationship with Shlomo whom I 
miss very much.   
Morris Moscovitch 
 
Introduction 
 4 
 
Declarative memory is typically defined as consisting of two independent systems: episodic and 
semantic (for reviews see Moscovitch, et al., 2005; Squire, 2004; Tulving, 2002). Episodic 
memory handles personal and contextually unique events, while semantic memory contains 
culturally-shared, acontextual factual information. Between these two extremes, however, lie 
several aspects of declarative memory that share some features with episodic and/or semantic 
memory, but may be dissociable from them. These aspects of memory are commonly referred to 
as personal semantics or personal semantic memory. Personal semantics is not well integrated 
into models of declarative memory and knowledge, in part because it has been little studied.  In a 
recent review (Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012), we noted that 
personal semantics has been operationalized in four main ways (autobiographical facts, self-
knowledge, repeated personal events, and autobiographically-significant concepts). Here we 
focus on two of these: autobiographical facts and repeated personal events. We examine the 
event-related potential (ERP) patterns associated with processing of autobiographical facts and 
repeated personal events, and compare them to episodic and semantic memory. 
Autobiographical facts constitute a set of personal information (e.g., I own a red bicycle; I 
have a diploma from McGill University), typically detached from its context of acquisition (W.F.  
Brewer, 1986; W.F. Brewer, 1996; M. A. Conway, 1987; Larsen, 1992; L. Renoult, et al., 2012). 
These autobiographical facts may form a kind of skeletal CV or autobiography (Warrington & 
McCarthy, 1988), which, along with some other types of personal semantics such as self-
knowledge, likely plays an important role in the maintenance of a sense of self in the present 
moment and across time (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2015; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013). 
Autobiographical facts are the type of personal semantics that is evaluated in the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989), via 
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questions about names of friends and colleagues, names of schools, addresses where one has 
lived, etc. The neural correlates of autobiographical facts were compared to general facts and 
unique events in a series of functional neuroimaging studies by Maguire and collaborators using 
a sentence verification paradigm (Maguire & Frith, 2003; Maguire, Henson, Mummery, & Frith, 
2001; Maguire & Mummery, 1999; Maguire, Mummery, & Buchel, 2000; Maguire, Vargha-
Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001). These studies showed overlap between these three types of memory 
in a left lateralized network, including the medial prefrontal cortex, lateral and medial temporal 
lobe and temporoparietal junction. The left hippocampus was more active for unique events than 
for the other types of memory (Maguire & Frith, 2003; Maguire & Mummery, 1999; Maguire, 
Vargha-Khadem, et al., 2001), whereas the left temporoparietal junction was more active for 
autobiographical than general facts (Maguire & Frith, 2003; Maguire & Mummery, 1999). In 
addition, the left medial prefrontal cortex and retrosplenial cortex showed a graded decreasing 
pattern of activity from unique events to autobiographical facts to general facts (Maguire & 
Frith, 2003; Maguire & Mummery, 1999; Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, et al., 2001).  
Memories of repeated events can be viewed as constellations of separate but similar 
episodes. During retrieval, one would not remember a single episode, but rather the common 
characteristics from across the series of similar events (Neisser, 1981), similar to a personal 
schema (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014). Accordingly, these memories are characterized by reduced 
temporal specificity, personal significance, emotionality, and detail as compared to memories of 
unique episodes (Addis, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Holland, Addis, & 
Kensinger, 2011; Levine, et al., 2004). However, in contrast to semantic memories, both 
memories of unique and repeated events have a spatial organization, that gives them their “basic 
context” (Rubin & Umanath, 2015). Barsalou (1988) was perhaps the first to report that a large 
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proportion of the content of autobiographical memories concerns repeated or summarized events 
(e.g., I brought my brother to school every day that winter; We would always eat that cake at 
Thanksgiving). This seminal study and the work of Conway and colleagues suggest that repeated 
events play an important role in autobiographical memory retrieval, particularly to access unique 
episodes (M. A. Conway, 2005; M. A. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Despite their 
prevalence and importance in autobiographical memory, memories for repeated events have 
rarely been studied. Compared to memories of autobiographical facts (e.g., My dog is named 
Rex), these memories have greater contextual specificity (e.g., I used to walk Rex in “Parc La 
Fontaine” when I lived in Montreal) and would typically involve a 1st person rather than a 3rd 
person type of recall (Renoult et al., 2012). As instances of memory for events, they are likely to 
be less static or permanent than memories of autobiographical facts (Warrington, 1986), but 
perhaps not as dynamic and perceptually specific as memories of unique events (e.g., I remember 
where Rex slipped his leash this morning). Indeed, a relative stability or slow updating 
(Wagenaar, 1992) of memories of repeated events would facilitate their privileged interactions 
with life stories and the conceptual self (M. A. Conway, 2005; M. A. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; see also McAdams, 2001; Neisser, 1988). Studying repeated events may provide some 
insight into how unique events may be transformed to facts (Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011).  
Neuropsychological (St-Laurent, Moscovitch, Levine, & McAndrews, 2009; Tulving, 
Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 1988) and neuroimaging findings (Addis, McIntosh, 
Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Addis, Moscovitch, et al., 2004; Ford, Addis, & 
Giovanello, 2011; Holland, et al., 2011; Levine, et al., 2004) have shown substantial overlap in 
the neural correlates of unique and repeated events, notably in the medial temporal lobe 
(including the hippocampus) and the anteromedial prefrontal cortex, but also a number of 
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differences. The parahippocampal gyrus and temporoparietal junction were found to be more 
active on the right for unique events and on the left for repeated events (Addis, Moscovitch, et 
al., 2004; Levine, et al., 2004). Moreover, repeated events were associated with greater lateral 
parietal cortex activity (BA 39 and 40) as compared to unique events (Holland, et al., 2011; 
Levine, et al., 2004) or general facts (Levine, et al., 2004). Activation in the hippocampus was 
sometimes found to be greater for unique than repeated events (Ford, et al., 2011; Holland, et al., 
2011), but not always (Addis, McIntosh, et al., 2004; Addis, Moscovitch, et al., 2004; Levine, et 
al., 2004). Interestingly, in the study of Holland et al. (2011), in which the initial construction of 
memories was contrasted with their subsequent elaboration, greater hippocampal involvement 
for unique than repeated events was found only during the construction phase. This selective 
activation may explain why differential hippocampal involvement for unique as compared to 
repeated events has not been found in other studies using specific retrieval cues, as the presence 
of these cues may eliminate the need for a construction phase. Finally, in Levine et al. (2004), in 
which memories for repeated events were compared to both unique events and general facts, a 
graded decreasing pattern of activity from unique events to repeated events to general facts was 
observed in left anteromedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, left premotor cortex and right 
retrosplenial cortex (see also Ford, et al., 2011). This graded pattern of activation is reminiscent 
to that observed in the studies of Maguire et al. using autobiographical facts, which suggests that 
both types of personal semantics (autobiographical facts and repeated events) can trigger 
intermediate degrees of neural activity in a common declarative memory network, while also 
involving distinct neural correlates. 
Despite a renewed interest in personal semantics in recent years (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014, 
2015; Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2012), only a handful of studies have compared personal 
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semantics to both semantic and episodic memory. It is thus still unclear whether the neural 
correlates of personal semantics can be distinguished from those of semantic and episodic 
memory. Similarly, whether personal semantics is a unified construct or whether different forms, 
such as autobiographical facts and repeated events, have distinct neural bases, still remains to be 
determined. One might conceive of these aspects of memory as falling along a continuum of 
abstraction from the personal/contextually unique to the general/acontextual (see Figure 1). 
However, as no studies to our knowledge have directly compared memories of repeated events 
and autobiographical facts, the evidence is essentially indirect. In our review on personal 
semantics (Renoult et al., 2012), we noted that current evidence suggests greater similarity in the 
neural correlates of general and autobiographical facts as compared to unique events, and greater 
similarity of repeated and unique events, as compared to general facts. For example, in 
neuropsychological studies, autobiographical and general facts are often preserved together 
while episodic memory is impaired (Hirano, Noguchi, Hosokawa, & Takayama, 2002; Levine, et 
al., 1998; McCarthy, Kopelman, & Warrington, 2005; Oxbury, Oxbury, Renowden, Squier, & 
Carpenter, 1997; Viskontas, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2000) or impaired together while 
episodic memory is relatively preserved (Eslinger, 1998; Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 
1992). Similarly, equivalent patterns of impairment of unique and repeated events along with 
preserved semantic memory have been described (St-Laurent, et al., 2009; Tulving, et al., 1988; 
see also Grilli and Verfaellie, 2015). However, a crucial factor in these comparisons is that the 
different types of memory are often measured in distinct tests that are not matched in task 
difficulty/demands (e.g., when comparing memory for facts and events in the AMI). Moreover, 
as no previous studies to our knowledge have directly compared autobiographical facts and 
repeated events, it is thus unclear whether they differ.  
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Insert Fig. 1 about here 
 
The goal of the present study was to compare the neural correlates of processing of unique 
events, repeated events, autobiographical facts, and general facts in the same experiment. At 
least two methodological problems have to be solved to carry out such comparisons. First, when 
comparing these forms of memory, one is confronted with a qualitative gap between facts and 
events (L. Renoult, et al., 2012): Tasks investigating the neural correlates of unique events 
(episodes) often rely on detailed remembering and re-experiencing, which is associated with long 
response times from participants (approximately 5-10s per trial; M. A. Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, 
Whitecross, & Sharpe, 2002; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006). This is quite different from 
tasks that require retrieval of semantic facts, for which reaction times are often between 0.8-1.5s 
(Chang, 1986). A convincing comparison of memory for facts and events would ideally require 
comparable task demands as evidenced by similar response times. 
Second, investigating personal memories often involves conducting pre-experimental 
individual interviews to create relevant stimuli. This complicates the execution and interpretation 
of the research in several ways: At the very least, it requires the use of different materials for 
each participant. It also creates ambiguity as to the precise content of memory retrieval, because 
it is difficult to be sure that participants are remembering the target personal events during 
testing and not recollecting their recent pre-experiment interview (Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007). 
One solution to this problem is to use materials that have an appropriate level of 
generality/commonality across participants, so that it is possible to measure personal forms of 
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memories without using idiosyncratic materials or conducting pre-experimental interviews. One 
such design has recently been used in an intracranial EEG (ECoG) study by Foster, Dastjerdi, 
and Parvizi, (2012). These authors contrasted the response of neurons in the posteromedial 
cortex (which includes the posterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and precuneus) during 
autobiographical retrieval and arithmetic calculation. The autobiographical conditions used a 
sentence verification task that compared autobiographical facts (“self-semantic condition”; e.g., I 
read books often), unique events (“self-episodic condition”, e,g., I read a book this week), and 
self-knowledge (e.g., “I am a quiet person”). Focusing on event-related changes in high-gamma 
power (70-180Hz), the authors observed a maximal increase in power during retrieval of unique 
events, a smaller increase for autobiographical facts, and a minimal response for self-knowledge. 
The onset of these responses ranged between 400 and 750ms after stimulus presentation. 
Electrodes responding maximally to unique events were found close to the splenium of the 
corpus callosum, including the retrosplenial cortex (see also Dastjerdi, et al., 2011). Interestingly, 
the retrosplenial cortex was one of the brain regions showing a graded decreasing pattern of 
activity from unique events to autobiographical facts to general facts in Maguire et al. fMRI 
studies (Maguire & Frith, 2003; Maguire & Mummery, 1999; Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, et al., 
2001), and from unique events to repeated events to general facts in Levine et al. (2004).  
In the present study, we adapted Foster et al.’s (2012) sentence verification paradigm to 
compare for the first time the neural correlates of memory for unique event, repeated events, 
autobiographical facts and general facts. An important advantage of the sentence verification 
paradigm to investigate autobiographical memory is that it is often associated with similar 
reaction times across conditions, making a comparison of their neural correlates less clouded by 
any behavioral differences (Maguire & Frith, 2003; Maguire, Henson, et al., 2001). As in Forster 
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et al. (2012), rather than relying on individual-specific material obtained in pre-test interviews, 
we used statements with an appropriate level of generality/commonality to allow participants to 
retrieve relevant personal or general memories. Like these authors, we took advantage of the 
excellent temporal resolution of electrophysiological recordings. To study how personal 
semantics compares to semantic and episodic memory, we focused on the N400 and the late 
positive component (LPC) of event-related potentials (ERPs), which have been reliably 
associated with semantic processing (reviewed in Kutas & Federmeier, 2011) and episodic 
recollection (reviewed in Wilding & Ranganath, 2012), respectively. As we describe below, 
these ERP components have the advantage of being robust indexes of declarative memory 
operations, relatively independently of the type of paradigm used or of the type of cognitive 
strategies adopted by the participants.   
The N400 is a negative deflection which develops between 200 and 500 ms after stimulus 
onset, with maximal amplitude at centro-parietal electrode sites, and frequently exhibits a right-
sided maximum (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). This ERP component has been studied in a variety 
of tasks relevant to semantic memory, such as lexical decision, semantic categorization, sentence 
verification and concreteness decisions (Renoult, in press). However, several studies have shown 
that the N400 can be elicited in tasks that do not rely on attention to semantic relations, such as 
tasks using masked primes and very short stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOA; Deacon, Hewitt, 
Yang, & Nagata, 2000; Kiefer, 2002; Misra & Holcomb, 2003; Schnyer, Allen, & Forster, 1997) 
or even during various sleep stages (Brualla, Romero, Serrano, & Valdizan, 1998; Ibanez, Lopez, 
& Cornejo, 2006; Perrin, Bastuji, & Garcia-Larrea, 2002). Neuropsychological studies report that 
left temporal and temporo-parietal lesions produce significant reductions in N400 amplitude, a 
pattern that is associated with comprehension deficits, but have no effect on the amplitude of late 
 12 
 
parietal components (Friederici, Hahne, & von Cramon, 1998; Hagoort, Brown, & Swaab, 1996; 
Swaab, Brown, & Hagoort, 1997).  
The LPC, also known as the ‘parietal old-new effect’ or ‘parietal EM (episodic memory) 
effect’, is a positive deflection that develops between 400 and 800ms after stimulus onset with 
maximum amplitude at posterior parietal sites and frequently exhibiting a left-sided maximum. It 
is considered to be a reliable index of episodic recollection (Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & 
Curran, 2007; Voss & Paller 2008; Wilding & Ranganath, 2012). This ERP component is 
sensitive to the “true memory status” of an item: old items wrongly categorized as new and new 
items wrongly categorized as old both elicit LPC amplitudes similar to new items (R. J. Johnson, 
Kreiter, Russo, & Zhu, 1998; Smith, 1993; Wilding, Doyle, & Rugg, 1995). Similarly, equivalent 
LPC amplitudes are found no matter whether participants responded truthfully or deceptively in 
a task (R. J. Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003; Tardif, Barry, Fox, & Johnstone, 2000). Amnesic 
patients with bilateral lesions of the hippocampus show preserved N400 effects but an absence of 
LPC effects (Addante, Ranganath, Olichney, & Yonelinas, 2012; Duzel, Vargha-Khadem, 
Heinze, & Mishkin, 2001; Olichney, et al., 2000), consistent with the role of this ERP 
component in episodic memory.  
In addition to N400 and LPC, we also considered the frontal N400 (FN400; also known 
as the mid-frontal old-new effect, Rugg & Curran, 2007). Like the N400, FN400 is a negative 
deflection which develops between 300 and 500 ms after stimulus onset, but unlike the N400, 
FN400’s maximal amplitude is usually at frontal/ fronto-central sites. The functional significance 
of this ERP component is still debated, with some investigators contending that it reflects 
familiarity-based recognition (reviewed in Curran, Tepe, & Piatt, 2006; Rugg & Curran, 2007), 
but others proposing that it instead reflects conceptual priming (Voss, Lucas, & Paller 2012), 
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similar to the centro-parietal N400 (Voss & Federmeier, 2011) . We included relevant frontal 
sites in our N400 analyses to explore the potential presence of FN400 and generate hypotheses 
about its role. 
So far, very few ERP studies of autobiographical memory have been conducted, and 
those that were did not distinguish among the four categories we have reviewed, making the 
results open to different interpretations. In one of these studies, Johnson, Simon, Henkell, and 
Zhu (2011) used short autobiographical statements and showed modulations of the LPC for 
statements that were congruent with participants’ personal experiences (see also Hu, Bergstrom, 
Bodenhausen, & Rosenfeld, 2015 for similar effects interpreted as P300 modulations), thus 
showing that this ERP component can be evoked by autobiographical in addition to (non-
personal) laboratory material. This was confirmed in a study by Renoult et al. (2015), in which 
the LPC was found to be increased for famous names that were associated with autobiographical 
episodes by the participants. Importantly, results from this study also illustrate that this ERP 
component is sensitive to the most automatic aspects of episodic retrieval, as the presence of 
associated episodes was only assessed after the experiment, and was thus incidental to task 
performance. In another ERP study, Watson, Dritschel, Obonsawin, and Jentzsch (2007) asked 
participants to evaluate the self-relevance of affective words, and observed increased N400 
amplitudes for stimuli that were discrepant with participants’ self-concept (i.e., positive words 
rated as non-self-referential, or negative words rated as self-referential; see also Fields & 
Kuperberg, 2015). Other ERP studies have looked at the impact of self-relevance on neural 
activity, typically by comparing one’s own name with other names (Folmer & Yingling, 1997; 
Muller & Kutas, 1996; Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010), but also by comparing one’s date of birth 
with another date (Ganis & Schendan, 2012), owned versus unowned objects (Miyakoshi, 
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Nomura, & Ohira, 2007) or statements in the second and third person  (i.e., “you” versus “he” or 
“she”; Fields & Kuperberg, 2012). These studies have typically reported increased amplitude of 
the LPC for self-relevant material (Ganis & Schendan, 2012; Miyakoshi, et al., 2007; Muller & 
Kutas, 1996), but also increased amplitude of the P300 component (or P3b; Folmer & Yingling, 
1997; Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010). Previous research has consistently demonstrated that P300 
and LPC are distinct components (Duzel & Heinze, 2002; Friedman, 1990; Herron, Quayle, & 
Rugg, 2003; Rugg & Nagy, 1989; Smith & Guster, 1993), even though they may involve partly 
overlapping neural generators in the medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus (Halgren, 
et al., 1995; Smith, et al., 1990; Smith, Stapleton, & Halgren, 1986). Self-relevant material 
indeed elicits activity in recollection related neural networks (Morel, et al., 2014; Viskontas, 
Quiroga, & Fried, 2009), but also more broadly in the fronto-parietal network also associated 
with P300 generation (Tacikowski, et al., 2011). Modulations of the N400 have not always been 
reported in these studies of self-relevance, and when they were, self-relevance was sometimes 
associated with an increased (Muller & Kutas 1996) or a decreased amplitude (Ganis & Shendan, 
2012). Note that some of these studies may have failed to identify N400 modulations as such 
because they used multiple presentations of the same stimuli (e.g., one’s own name), which 
results in the N400 peaking substantially earlier than usual (e.g., Renoult & Debruille, 2011; 
Renoult, Wang, Calcagno, Prévost, & Debruille, 2012). Nonetheless, as self-relevant material 
could activate both personal semantics and episodic memory, modulations of both the N400 and 
the LPC would be expected. Even though sensitivity of the LPC to episodic autobiographical 
retrieval has been clearly established (Johnson et al., 2011; Renoult et al., 2015), modulation of 
the N400 to personal in addition to general semantics still needs confirmation and could help 
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clarify whether personal semantics is simply a subcomponent of semantic memory or involves 
partly distinct neural correlates (Renoult et al., 2012).  
To overcome the ambiguity of the nature of the memories probed in the previous studies, 
we examined how ERPs in the time windows of the N400 and the LPC would differ for 
responses to unique events, repeated events, autobiographical facts, and general facts. On the one 
hand, we hypothesized that the two types of personal semantics conditions, autobiographical 
facts and repeated events, by their self-relevance, should elicit modulations of the LPC, but that 
maximum amplitudes would be produced by the unique events condition, as this ERP component 
is particularly sensitive to retrieval from episodic memory (Wilding & Ranganath, 2012). On the 
other hand, as neuroimaging studies show an overlap in the neural substrates of autobiographical 
and general facts, we hypothesized that autobiographical facts would modulate the N400, but 
that maximum N400 amplitudes would be associated with general facts, knowing the sensitivity 
of this component to retrieval from semantic memory (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Finally, even 
though no prior study to our knowledge has compared the neural correlates of autobiographical 
facts and repeated events, we hypothesized that these two types of personal semantics would 
differ, with repeated events being more similar to unique events (essentially modulating the LPC; 
Rubin & Umanath, 2015) and autobiographical facts more similar to general facts (essentially 
modulating the N400; Renoult et al., 2012).    
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
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Twenty-seven right-handed participants (12 men) completed the Sentence Verification Task. 
They were aged between 18 and 31 years old (mean age: 23.56 ± 3.64), and with mean years of 
education of 15.59 ± 1.91. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were recruited 
through posters displayed on the campus of the University of Ottawa or word of mouth. 
Exclusion criteria included a history of head injury with loss of consciousness longer than 5 min, 
and other neurological or medical conditions known to compromise brain function, and active 
substance abuse. All participants signed an informed consent form approved by the Research 
Ethics Board of the University of Ottawa. Participants were compensated $15 per hour of 
participation. 
 
Experimental Tasks  
We adapted the sentence verification paradigm used by Foster et al. (2012). We replaced the 
“self-judgment” and “math” conditions with repeated events and general facts conditions. We 
modified the “self-episodic” and “self-semantic” conditions to create our unique events and 
autobiographical facts conditions: the original sentences were edited and new sentences were 
added to obtain a total of 67 sentences by condition (compared to 48 in the original study; see 
Appendix). In Foster et al. (2012), the “self-episodic” and “self-semantic” conditions differed 
only in their temporal specificity: only the former included specific temporal markers. We kept a 
similar logic in our study and used the same main clauses for the sentences of our 4 experimental 
conditions (general facts, autobiographical facts, repeated events, and unique events). The 
conditions differed only in two aspects: 1) The tense changed from past tense for unique events, 
to present perfect for repeated events, to present for facts (general and autobiographical). The 
type of awareness associated with semantic memory is indeed thought to be centred in the 
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present, whereas episodic recollection is oriented towards the past (Tulving, 2001, 2002). 2) We 
added distinct cue words that preceded each condition and gave different degrees of temporal 
specificity. We used the same number of cues for each condition (6). In the unique events 
condition, we used specific time cues (Last night, Last week-end, This morning, This week, 
Today, Yesterday) to promote access to specific instances of events (e.g., “Last week-end, I 
watered a plant”). In the repeated events condition, we used script-like cues (When at school, 
When at work, When on the bus, When on vacation, When shopping, When with friends, When 
alone), and constrained their temporal scope by asking participants to verify sentences by 
thinking about events that happened repeatedly within the last year (e.g., “When on vacation, I 
have watered a plant”). In the autobiographical facts condition, we used general time cues (Every 
day, Often, Rarely, Sometimes, Usually, Very often) for participants to report what is usual for 
them (“Often, I water a plant”). For the general facts condition, the first-person personal pronoun 
(I) and the 6 cues were replaced by 6 distinct 3
rd
 person perspectives (Everyone, Few people, 
Many people, Most people, No one, Some people; see Appendix for list of all sentences), and 
participants had to report  what they thought was generally true for people in their country 
(“Most people water plants”).  
 The sentences were piloted in each condition to obtain a comparable number of yes and no 
responses (in other words approximately 33 of each).  
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated comfortably in a dimly lit room in front of a computer screen 
placed 1 m from their eyes. E-Prime 2.0 was used for stimulus presentation. Cue words were 
displayed for 2s on a single screen, and then each word of the remaining sentence appeared 
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individually for 200ms. The stimuli were presented on the center of a white screen and written in 
New Courier 12 black font. We intercalated the cues and each of the words with a 200ms white 
screen.  The last word of the sentence appeared for 3s, punctuated with a question mark, at which 
time participants had 4s to decide whether each sentence was true or false (for themselves for the 
personal conditions and for most people for the general facts condition) using one of two 
keyboard keys. Each trial ended with 2s blink screen. When needed, participants took short 
breaks between blocks.  
The 4 different experimental conditions (general facts, autobiographical facts, repeated 
events, and unique events) were presented in different block of trials, so that participants could 
maintain a specific mode of processing when verifying the sentences. Four orders for the block 
presentation were obtained using the Latin Square method, and these were assigned randomly to 
each participant. Likewise, the order of the sentences was randomized within each block.  
 
EEG Acquisition 
The Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with a 63-channel active electrode system 
(Brain Products GmbH) embedded in a nylon cap (10/10 system extended). An additional 
electrode was placed under the left eye in order to monitor vertical eye movements (lower EOG). 
The continuous EEG signal was acquired at a 500 Hz sampling rate using a right mastoid 
reference. The impedance was kept below 20 kΩ. The high filter was set at 500 Hz and the time 
constant was 10 s. A vertical EOG was reconstructed offline as the difference between the lower 
EOG and FP1 activity. A horizontal EOG was constructed by subtracting F7 from F8 activity.  
Offline analyses were conducted using EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and 
ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014), two open source toolboxes running under Matlab 
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7.12 (R2013a, The Mathworks). High- and low-pass filter half-amplitude cutoffs were set at 0.01 
and 80 Hz, respectively. An average reference was computed offline and used for all analyses. 
Before averaging, trials contaminated by excessive artifacts were rejected automatically with a 
step function (Luck, 2005) with a voltage threshold of ± 100 μV in moving windows of 200 ms 
and with a window step of 100 ms. Noisy channels were interpolated using the EEGLAB 
function  eeg_interp (spherical interpolation) . This resulted in the following average number of 
trials per condition: Autobiographical facts: “Yes” responses: 37 ± 5, “No” responses: 29 ± 5; 
General Facts: “Yes”: 37 ± 6, “No”: 29 ± 6; Repeated Events:“Yes”: 35 ± 8, “No”: 31 ± 9; 
Unique Events:“Yes”: 25 ± 5, “No”: 41 ± 5. 
The EEG was segmented into epochs of 1 s (from -200 ms prior to, to 800 ms after the 
onset of the final words). ERPs were time-locked to the final word of the sentences. The 
amplitudes of the N400 and the LPC were measured as the mean of all data points between 300 
to 500 ms and 500 to 700 ms, respectively. They were measured relative to the mean of all data 
points in the 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Electrode sites were grouped in 5 subsets: a  
prefrontal subset including FP1/2, AF7/8, AF3/4, a sagittal subset, including Fz, FCz, Cz, and 
CPz, a para-sagittal subset, including F3/4, FC3/4, C3/4, and CP3/4, a posterior parietal subset 
including P1/2, P3/4, and PO3/4, and a lateral subset including FT9/10, FT7/8, T7/8, TP7/8, and 
TP9/10  (see Figure 2).  
 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
 
 Statistical analyses 
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We ran one repeated-measures ANOVA on mean reaction times (RTs). It had memory type (4; 
general facts, autobiographical facts, repeated events, and unique events) and response (“yes” 
and “no”) as within-subjects factors. Another repeated-measures ANOVA was run on response 
proportion (i.e., proportion of “yes”). It had memory type as within-subjects factor. 
For ERP data, we ran initial repeated-measures ANOVAs with memory type (general 
facts, autobiographical facts, repeated events, and unique events), electrode subset (prefrontal, 
sagittal, para-sagittal, posterior parietal and lateral) and time window (300-500 and 500-700) as 
within-subject factors. For these ANOVAs, for each subset of electrode, we considered the 
average voltage measures across electrodes and hemispheres (please note that the sagittal subset 
of electrodes did not have a hemisphere factor). Subsequent repeated-measures ANOVAs were 
conducted with memory type, hemisphere (right vs. left) and electrode (3, 4 or 5 electrodes 
depending on subset) as within-subject factors. The false discovery rate  (FRD) correction was 
applied for all these subsequent ANOVAs (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995), using q = 0.05. Only 
“yes” responses were retained for the ERP analyses, as this condition was not associated with 
reaction times differences between memory types (see below), which allowed a more unbiased 
comparison of their neural correlates. 
The Greenhouse and Geisser (1959) procedure was used to compensate for possible 
violations of the sphericity assumption associated with the electrode factor, when appropriate. In 
this case, the original degrees of freedom are reported together with the epsilon (E) and the 
corrected probability level.  
For both behavioral and ERP data, partial eta-squared (η2) is indicated as a measure of 
effect size. 
Insert Fig. 3 about here 
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Results 
 
Behavioral data: Reaction Times  
 
Interactions between memory type and response 
The repeated-measures ANOVA on mean reaction times revealed no main effect of memory type 
(p > .25) but an interaction between this factor and response (F3,63 = 11.08, p < .001,  η
2
 = .34). 
To further investigate the interaction, we conducted separate repeated ANOVAs for “yes” and 
“no” responses. 
For “yes” responses, there was no main effect of memory type (p > .25). Mean reaction 
times were 1190 ms (± 265) for general facts, 1206 ms (± 243) for autobiographical facts, 1243 
ms (±294) for repeated events and 1252 ms (± 266) for unique events (see Figure 3). 
For “no” responses, there was a main effect of memory type (F3,63 = 3.67, p = .02,  η
2
 = 
.15). Further analyses showed that negative responses to autobiographical facts (1285 ms ± 275) 
were faster than to general facts (1374 ms ± 333; F1,26 = 4.52, p = .04,  η
2
 = .16) but tended to be 
slower compared to unique events (1216 ms ± 247; F1,26 = 3.63, p = .07,  η
2
 = .13). In addition, 
negative responses to unique events were faster than to general facts (F1,26 = 10.96, p = .003,  η
2
 
= .3) and faster than to repeated events (1355 ms ± 336; F1,26 = 8.87, p = .006,  η
2
 = .25). No 
differences were observed between negative responses to general facts and repeated events and 
between negative responses to autographical facts and repeated events (all p > .25). 
 
Analyses of responses for each memory type 
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The repeated-measures ANOVA on mean reaction times in the general facts conditions revealed 
a main effect of response (F1,26 = 29.62, p < .001,  η
2
 = .54), with faster reaction times for “yes” 
(mean: 1190 ±265) than for “no” (mean: 1374 ±333) responses. Similarly, for autobiographical 
facts, reaction times were faster for “yes” (mean: 1206 ±243) than for “no” responses (mean: 
1285 ±275; F1,26 = 6.75, p = .02,  η
2
 = .23). The same pattern was observed for repeated events 
with shorter reaction times for “yes” (mean: 1243 ±294) than for “no” responses (mean: 1355 
±336; F1,26 = 14.02, p = .001,  η
2
 = .36). However, for unique events, reaction times for “yes” 
(mean: 1252 ±266) did not differ significantly from “no” responses (mean: 1216 ±247, p = .13). 
 
 
Behavioral data: Response Proportion 
 The repeated measures ANOVA on response proportion (i.e., proportion of “yes”) revealed a 
main effect of memory type (F3,63 = 28.19, p < .001,  η
2
 = .56). Further analyses showed that the 
proportion of “yes” responses was lower for unique events (mean proportion: 0.38 ± 0.1) than for 
autobiographical facts (mean number: 0.55 ± 0.1; F1,26 = 125.44, p < .001,  η
2
 = .84), general 
facts (0.55 ± 0.1; F1,26 = 66.89, p < .001,  η
2
 = .72) and repeated events (0.51 ± 0.1; F1,26 = 34.88, 
p < .001,  η2 = .57). There was also a trend for a greater proportion of “yes” responses for general 
facts than repeated events (F1,26 = 3.68, p = .066,  η
2
 = .13), but no difference between 
autobiographical facts and repeated events (p > .19), and between autobiographical and general 
facts (all p > .25).  
 
Insert Fig. 4 about here 
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Electrophysiological data 
For electrophysiological data, we focused our analyses on “yes” responses for which a memory 
trace was presumably available to participants. This condition was not associated with reaction 
times differences between memory types (see above), which allowed a more unbiased 
comparison of their neural correlates.  
To verify that the different types of memory affected the ERP components differently, we 
conducted an initial analysis including memory type (general facts, autobiographical facts, 
repeated events, and unique events), electrode subset (sagittal, para-sagittal, posterior parietal, 
lateral and prefrontal) and time window (300-500 and 500-700). This produced a significant 
interaction between these three factors (F12,312 = 2.44, p = .005,  η
2
 = .083)
1
. Subsequent analyses 
revealed that the interaction between memory type and electrode subset was significant in both 
the N400 (F12,324 = 2.31, p = .008,  η
2
 = .079) and the LPC (F12,324 = 2.21, p = .025,  η
2
 = .13) 
time windows. We then broke down analyses of memory effects in subsequent 3-way ANOVAs 
(memory type x electrode x hemisphere) separately for each time window and electrode subset, 
followed by pairwise comparisons of memory types for the subsets of electrodes for which the 
main effect of memory type was significant. For all these analyses, we applied correction for 
multiple comparisons using the false discovery rate (FDR; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995), with q 
= 0.05. 
 
Insert Fig. 5 about here 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The same analysis on “no” responses produced no significant interaction (p = .45). 
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N400 time window (300 to 500) 
The repeated-measures ANOVAs on the mean voltage amplitudes in the N400 time window 
showed a main effect of memory type (corrected threshold of significance using FDR: q* = 0.04) 
at sagittal (F3,78 = 3.27, p = .033,  η
2
 = .11), para-sagittal (F3,78 = 3.48, p = .028,  η
2
 = .12), 
posterior parietal (F3,78 = 10.10, p < .001,  η
2
 = .40), and lateral (F3,78 = 4.82, p = .011,  η
2
 = .15) 
subsets of electrodes, but not at the prefrontal subset (see Figure 4). In addition, there was an 
interaction between memory types and the electrode factor at the sagittal subset of electrodes 
(F9,234 = 2.52, p = .039,  η
2
 = .10). Further analyses showed that the effect of memory type was 
significant at Cz (F3,78 = 4.08, p = .020,  η
2
 = .13) and CPz (F3,78 = 5.42, p = .004,  η
2
 = .17) but 
not at Fz and FCz (p ≥.13), illustrating its centro-parietal distribution. Overall, the amplitude of 
N400 was maximal at CPz followed by Cz for the general facts condition. As illustrated by 
Figure 5, the N400 had a classic right-centro-parietal distribution for general facts. 
To further investigate how memory types differed, we then compared each type of 
memory in separate repeated-measures ANOVAs for the subsets of electrodes for which the 
main effect of memory type was significant, using the FDR correction (corrected threshold of 
significance: q* = 0.02).  
 
Insert Fig. 6 about here 
 
General Facts versus Autobiographical Facts  
General facts were associated with more negative amplitudes than autobiographical facts at the 
sagittal (F1,26 = 8.54, p < .001,  η
2
 = .24) and posterior parietal subsets of electrodes (F1,26 = 7.66, 
p = .014,  η2 = .34; see Figures 4, 6 and 7). In contrast, general facts tended to produce less 
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negative amplitudes than autobiographical facts at the lateral subset (F1,26 = 5.73, p = .024,  η
2
 = 
.18). 
 
General Facts versus Repeated Events 
General facts produced more negative amplitudes than repeated events the posterior parietal 
subset of electrodes (F1,26 = 6.76, p = .020,  η
2
 = .31; see Figures 4 and 6). A similar effect at the 
sagittal subset (F1,26 = 3.51, p = .036,  η2 = .12) did not survive correction for FDR. Over 
posterior parietal electrodes, the difference between general facts and repeated events appeared 
more pronounced over the right than the left hemisphere (see Figures 6 and 7B) but the 
interaction between memory type and hemisphere did not reach the threshold of the corrected 
level of significance (F1,26 = 3.36, p = .05,  η
2
 = .18).  
Conversely, general facts produced less negative amplitudes than repeated events at the 
lateral subset of electrodes (F1,26 = 8.10, p = .008,  η
2
 = .23). At this subset, there was an 
interaction between memory type, electrode and hemisphere (F4,104 = 3.57, p = .020,  η
2
 = .12). 
Further analyses showed that general facts produced less negative amplitudes than repeated 
events at T7/T8 (F1,26 = 5.67, p = .02,  η
2
 = .17), FT9/10 (F1,26 = 9.96, p = .004,  η
2
 = .27) and at 
FT7/8 (F1,26 = 11.98, p = .002,  η
2
 = .31; see Figures 6 and 8).  
 
Insert Fig. 7 about here 
 
General Facts versus Unique Events 
General facts produced more negative amplitudes than unique events at sagittal (F1,26 = 4.76, 
p = .017,  η2 = .15), para-sagittal (F1,26 = 11.15, p = .002,  η
2
 = .29), and posterior parietal subsets 
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of electrodes (F1,26 = 42.33, p < .001,  η
2
 = .74), but less negative amplitudes at the lateral subset 
(F1,26 = 6.09, p = .020,  η
2
 = .18; see Figure 4). At the lateral subset (F4,104 = 3.63, p = .017,  η
2
 = 
.12), an interactions between memory type and electrode was found. Further analyses showed 
that general facts were associated with less negative amplitudes than unique events at FT9/10 
(F1,26 = 10.34, p = .003, η
2
 = .27) and FT7/8 (F1,26 = 10.69, p = .003, η
2
 = .28; see Figure 8).  
 
Autobiographical Facts versus Unique Events 
Autobiographical facts were associated with more negative amplitudes than unique events at the 
posterior parietal subset of electrodes (F1,26 = 8.06, p = .012,  η
2
 = .35; see Figure 4 and 7B). In 
contrast, these memory types did not differ at the sagittal, para-sagittal and lateral subsets of 
electrodes (p ≥.22). 
Repeated Events versus Unique Events 
Repeated events tended to be associated with more negative amplitudes than unique events at the 
posterior parietal subset of electrodes (F1,26 = 5.65, p = .031,  η2 = .27; see Figure 4). However, 
this effect did not survive correction for FDR. These memory types did not differ at the sagittal, 
para-sagittal and lateral subsets of electrodes (p ≥.18).  
 
Autobiographical Facts versus Repeated Events 
Autobiographical facts and repeated events did not differ for any of the subsets of electrodes (all 
ps > .25). 
 
Insert Fig. 8 about here 
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LPC time window (500 to 700) 
The repeated-measures ANOVAs on the mean voltage amplitudes in the LPC time window 
showed a main effect of memory type at the posterior parietal subset of electrodes (F3,78 = 6.78, 
p = .001,  η2 = .31, see Figure 4). At the sagittal (F3,78 = 3.78, p = .021, η2 = .12) and para-
sagittal (F3,78  = 2.71, p = .05, η2 = .15) subsets, similar effects did not survive correction for 
FDR (corrected threshold of significance: q* = 0.01).  
 Overall, the amplitude of the LPC was maximal at P1 and PO3 for the unique events 
condition. As illustrated by Figure 9, the LPC had a classic left posterior-parietal distribution for 
unique events. 
To further investigate how memory types differed, we then compared each type of 
memory in separate repeated-measures ANOVAs at the posterior parietal subset of electrodes for 
which a significant effect of memory type was found, using the FDR correction (corrected 
threshold of significance: q* = 0.025).  
   
Insert Fig. 9 about here 
 
At the posterior parietal subset of electrodes, mean voltage amplitudes in the LPC time 
window were greater for unique events than general facts (F1,26 = 14.48, p = .002,  η
2
 = .49). 
They were also greater for autobiographical than general facts (F1,26 = 8.04, p = .013, η
2
 = .35) 
and for repeated events than general facts (F1,26 = 8.27, p = .012,  η
2
 = .35; see Figure 4). 
However, even though LPC amplitudes tended to be more positive for unique than repeated 
events (F1,26 = 5.36, p = .035,  η
2
 = .26), and for unique events than autobiographical facts (F1,26 
= 3. 41, p = .046,  η2 = .18; see Figures 4 and 10), these effect did not survive correction for 
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FDR. Finally, the two types of personal semantics (i.e., repeated events and autobiographical 
facts) did not differ in the LPC time window (p < .1). 
 
Insert Fig. 10 about here 
 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first ERP study to compare the neural correlates of personal 
semantics to both semantic and episodic memory. Using a sentence verification task, we have 
found that the neural correlates of personal semantics can be differentiated from those of the two 
main types of declarative memory, episodic (i.e, unique events) and semantic memory (i.e., 
general facts).  
For all types of memory except unique events, true sentences were verified faster than 
false. When the sentence verification paradigm is used to assess general facts, true statements are 
generally verified faster than false ones (reviewed in Chang, 1986). A similar effect was 
observed here for the two types of personal semantics: statements congruent with personal 
experience were verified faster than were incongruent statements. As in the present study, 
Conway (1987) observed that true general or personal statements were verified faster than untrue 
general or personal false statements. Moreover, reaction times to primed general or personal 
facts were faster than to unprimed general or personal facts. The presence of priming and 
congruency effects for personal knowledge suggests some similarity in structural organization to 
general knowledge. Conway (1987) proposed that knowledge of autobiographical facts could be 
represented along with general knowledge or indexed by it. Interestingly, using similar stimuli as 
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in Conway (1987), Conway and Bekerian (1987) found no priming effects for specific 
autobiographical experiences, consistent with the absence of difference in reaction time between 
true and false unique events in the present study. Note, however, that context-specific cues such 
as “lifetime periods” (e.g., school days) or goal-derived categories (“means to travel to a holiday 
location”) did prime retrieval of memories of unique events (Conway, 1990; Conway & 
Bekerian, 1987; Reiser, Black, & Abelson, 1985). Taken together, these studies show similarities 
in the organization of personal and general semantics, and also some differences between the 
organization of both types of semantics and episodic memory.  
Crucially, for true sentences, no difference in reaction times was observed between 
memory types in the present study. This is important as it ensures that the four types of memory 
were equated in terms of retrieval demands, thus rendering it unlikely that differences in 
behavioral performance could have influenced the differences in ERPs.  
Our electrophysiological results showed that, as hypothesized, the amplitude of N400 
was maximal for general facts. It reached its maximal value at centro-parietal-sites (Cz and CPz), 
consistent with the typical distribution of this component (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). N400 
amplitude was significantly reduced for autobiographical facts and repeated events and minimal 
for unique events. The greatest difference between general and autobiographical facts was 
observed over sagittal electrode sites, whereas the greatest difference between general facts and 
repeated events occurred at posterior parietal sites. Over lateral sites for which the amplitude of 
the N400 is typically reduced (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 1982), all the personal conditions 
(autobiographical facts, repeated events, and unique events) produced more negative amplitudes 
than general facts, especially at fronto-temporal sites (FT7/8, FT9/10). Bearing in mind the poor 
spatial resolution of the EEG and the absence of source localization, these results are reminiscent 
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of neuroimaging findings of greater activation of brain regions such as the temporal pole and 
medial frontal cortex for personal forms of memory as compared to general facts (Maguire & 
Frith, 2003; Maguire & Mummery, 1999; Renoult et al., 2012). In future, our paradigm could be 
run with fMRI to compare the patterns of activation associated with autobiographical facts, 
repeated events, and episodic and semantic processing.  
As hypothesized, the LPC (or parietal old-new effect; Wilding & Ranganath, 2012), 
associated with retrieval from episodic memory, reached its maximal values at posterior parietal 
sites (P1 and PO3) for unique events. At these sites, it was significantly reduced for general 
facts. These results are in agreement with a recent study by Johnson et al. (2011), who reported a 
greater LPC effect for true autobiographical statements compared to general facts. As observed 
in the N400 time window, both personal semantics conditions were associated with more 
positive voltage amplitudes than general facts. Under a liberal threshold (p < 0.05, uncorrected), 
LPC amplitudes were also greater for unique events than for both types of personal semantics. 
These differences were observed over posterior parietal sites, where this component is usually 
maximal (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Wilding & Ranganath, 2012).  
Interestingly, contrary to our hypothesis, no difference in the neural correlates of memory 
for autobiographical facts and repeated personal events was observed in any of the analyses. 
Even though no study to our knowledge had directly compared the neural correlates of these 
types of memory before, this finding is compatible with certain conceptualizations of them 
belonging to the same category of “semantic autobiographical memory” (e.g., Martinelli et al., 
2012). By their very nature of being repeated, memories of repeated events are more extended in 
time than unique events. It is possible that when such events are repeated over a very long period 
of time, they may end up being similar to autobiographical facts, which are acontextual and 
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usually more abstract, constituting a transition stage in one type of transformation of episodic 
memories to schemas (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014) or to facts and semantic memory (Winocur & 
Moscovitch, 2011). It is thus important to note that the similarity between autobiographical facts 
and repeated events in our study was observed despite the fact that we limited the category of 
repeated events to the last year. If anything, this manipulation should have decreased the 
similarity between autobiographical facts and repeated events, and increased the similarity 
between repeated and unique events. Yet, it is possible that the use of everyday scenarios rather 
than statements taken from individual interviews may have made the retrieval of repeated events 
more similar to that of autobiographical facts. While this is a possibility, it is important to specify 
that these general statements still resulted in general semantics differing from the two aspects of 
personal semantics.  
More generally, the sentence verification paradigm has sometimes been criticized 
because even when the sentences are based on personal events, the act of verification does not 
necessarily require subjective re-experiencing, and even if this occurs it is not assessed (e.g., M. 
A. Conway, et al., 2002; Graham, Lee, Brett, & Patterson, 2003). In a review of these studies, 
Maguire (2001) nevertheless argued that participants in her experiments typically reported that 
the sentences evoked the recall of the original unique events. While we did not obtain detailed 
ratings from our participants allowing us to make such statement, we found that the LPC, 
associated with episodic recollection (Wilding & Ranganath, 2012), was maximal over posterior 
parietal sites when participants verified statements based on unique events, as compared to when 
they verified general facts. The LPC was also greater when they verified statements based on 
autobiographical facts or repeated events as compared to general facts. Although 
autobiographical fact and repeated personal events were also distinguished from unique events, 
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the comparison did not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Such findings indicate that 
retrieval of personal semantics likely engages episodic memory to some extent (Westmacott & 
Moscovitch, 2003), a process which is reflected in LPC amplitude. Consistent with this 
interpretation, we did not find any frontal effect similar to the FN400, often associated with 
familiarity (reviewed in Curran, Tepe, & Piatt, 2006). This constitutes indirect evidence that the 
events were recollected rather than simply familiar to the participants. Crucially, the major 
advantage of the sentence verification paradigm is that it allows us to optimally match conditions 
on task difficulty and retrieval demands. In the present study, no response time differences 
between conditions were observed when participants reported that the sentences were congruent 
with their personal experience (‘yes” responses). 
While the use of paradigms involving rich and detailed episodic recollection is of crucial 
importance to better understand episodic memory, these paradigms may not necessarily 
constitute optimal contrasts with semantic memory. Moreover, the use of everyday 
autobiographical memories, as in the present study and in Foster et al. (2012), allows participants 
to enter different retrieval orientations (Rugg & Wilding, 2000), without the need to conduct pre-
experimental interviews and to use different materials for each participant. Here, we chose to 
rely on the same sentence clauses across the four conditions and to add distinct cue words that 
preceded each condition and gave different degrees of temporal specificity: from specific time 
cues for unique events (e.g., “Last week-end, I watered a plant”), script-like cues for repeated 
events (e.g., “When on vacation, I have watered a plant”), general time cues for autobiographical 
facts (“Often, I water a plant”) and no time cues but the same number of 3rd person perspectives 
for general facts (“Most people water plants”). The tense of the sentences also changed from past 
for unique events, present perfect for repeated events, to present for facts (general and 
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autobiographical). This was done as the type of awareness associated with semantic memory is 
thought to be centered in the present, whereas episodic recollection is oriented towards the past 
(Tulving, 2001, 2002). We considered the cues and tense used to be crucial to the adoption of 
different retrieval orientations as the clauses were otherwise identical.  
Moscovitch and colleagues proposed a two-stage recollection process, with the first being 
fast and non-conscious, and the second one being slower and conscious (Hannula & Ranganath, 
2009; Moscovitch, 2008; Sheldon & Moscovitch, 2010). In sentence verification paradigms like 
ours, it is unclear whether participants only rely on the first stage to come up with their 
decisions, that is, distinct types of ecphories (i.e., automatic interactions between the sentences 
and a corresponding memory trace; Tulving, 1983) or also on the second stage involving 
conscious and effortful re-experiencing. The first stage would involve the hippocampus, while 
the second would depend on interactions between the prefrontal and parietal cortex with the 
hippocampus. Neuroimaging studies of autobiographical memory are consistent with the 
importance of the hippocampus in the first stage, as hippocampal activity would typically peak 
during early recovery of the memory trace and then decline during the re-experiencing phase 
(Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Daselaar, et al., 2008; Sheldon & Levine, 2015; Vilberg & Rugg, 
2012). The present ERP effects may be tapping into both types of recollections or only the 
former. Future studies, along the lines of Sheldon and Moscovitch (2010) and Hannula and 
Ranganath (2009) are needed to determine which is the case.  
In our review on personal semantics (Renoult, et al., 2012), we concluded that the extant 
literature supported the idea that the neural correlates of autobiographical facts would be similar 
to general facts, and those of repeated events would be similar to unique events, and that studies 
contrasting these four types of memory were needed. Even though our results show a significant 
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overlap in the scalp distribution of general and autobiographical facts, particularly over centro-
parietal sites, the neural correlates of these types of memory could clearly be differentiated both 
in the N400 and LPC time windows. In the N400 time window, general facts were associated 
with more negative amplitudes than autobiographical facts at sagittal and posterior parietal sites, 
while autobiographical facts produced more negative amplitudes than general facts at lateral 
sites, especially at fronto-temporal sites. In the LPC time window, autobiographical facts were 
associated with more positive amplitudes than general facts over posterior parietal sites. In 
agreement with Renoult et al. (2012) taxonomy, the neural correlates of repeated events did not 
consistently differ from those of unique events. Similarly to Addis et al. (2004), differences only 
emerged when using a liberal threshold (p < 0.05, uncorrected). In these conditions, repeated 
events were associated with more negative amplitudes than unique events over posterior parietal 
sites, both in the N400 and LPC time windows. In any case, repeated events could clearly be 
more easily distinguished from general facts than from unique events. The scalp distribution 
observed for memories of repeated events in the LPC time window was indeed similar to that 
usually observed for episodic retrieval (e.g., old-new effects) and here for unique events. In 
fMRI studies, activation of the hippocampus was sometimes reported to be greater for unique 
than repeated events (Ford, et al., 2011; Holland, et al., 2011), but not always (Addis, McIntosh, 
et al., 2004; Addis, Moscovitch, et al., 2004; Levine, et al., 2004). Further studies are thus 
needed to specify how the neural correlates of memories of repeated events differ from those of 
unique events. As we note below, one possible factor to explain a certain inconsistency in the 
difference between unique and repeated events is that it is possible that some memories of 
repeated events evoked recollective experiences, while others do not (Renoult, et al., 2015) 
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 Three broad conceptualizations of personal semantics were proposed in our review 
(Renoult et al, 2012): 1) that personal semantics could be a sub-domain of semantic memory, 2) 
that declarative memory could be organized according to a continuum of abstraction from 
abstract/acontextual to personal/contextual and 3) that PS, semantic and episodic memory could 
involve a different weighting of different component processes (see Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013 
on process-specific alliances). While the present results cannot be used to definitively decide 
between these views, a number of observations can be made. First the apparent graded ERP 
modulations observed for the four types of memory appear, at first view, compatible with a 
continuum model. Both ERP components were sensitive to the continuum of abstraction from 
general/acontextual (general facts) to personal/acontextual or personal/contextually repeated 
information (autobiographical facts and repeated events), to personal and contextually unique 
information (unique events). Brain regions sensitive to such a continuum of temporal specificity 
have been described by a number of fMRI studies. They include regions such as the medial 
prefrontal cortex and retrosplenial cortex that show a graded decreasing pattern of activity from 
unique events to autobiographical facts to general facts (Maguire & Frith, 2003; Maguire & 
Mummery, 1999; Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, et al., 2001) and from unique events to repeated 
events to general facts (Levine, et al., 2004). However, our results are also compatible with a 
component process perspective (Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013; Moscovitch, 1992). Memory for 
general facts and for unique events were essentially associated with modulations of different 
ERP components: The N400 was maximal for general facts and minimal for unique events, while 
the LPC was maximal for unique events and not really apparent for general facts. There would 
thus be a qualitative gap between these two poles as only episodic memory would rely on 
processes such as self-reflection, detailed sensory-perceptual imagery, or chronological re-
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experiencing. Besides, the fact that all the personal conditions (autobiographical facts, repeated 
events and unique events) produced greater amplitudes than general facts at anterior temporal 
sites during the time window of the N400 could indicate that these personal forms of memory 
involved greater weighting of a common component process, perhaps involved in self-reflection 
or in extracting the more idiosyncratic aspects of semantic information (Ross & Olson, 2011; 
Tranel, 2009).    
 The present findings indicate that the neural correlates of personal semantics can be 
differentiated from semantic and episodic memory. Crucially, we observed this using a design 
that could have minimized these differences: the sentences we used were very closely matched 
between conditions and no reaction time differences were associated with these neural 
differences. Personal semantics thus really appears as an intermediate form of memory: 
memories of autobiographical facts were associated with modulations of the N400 with 
amplitudes falling halfway between the two extremes constituted by general facts and unique 
events. Similar observations were made for memories for repeated events and in the LPC time 
window, using a liberal threshold (p = 0.05). Our results, therefore, show that personal semantics 
has shared neural bases with both semantic and episodic memory, while being distinguishable 
from each of these types of memory. It will be important in the future to integrate these 
intermediate forms of memory into more comprehensive models of declarative memory. 
One possible challenge will be the potential heterogeneity of personal semantics, not only 
across its four operational definitions (i.e., autobiographical facts, self-knowledge, repeated 
personal events, and autobiographically-significant concepts), but also within each of these 
categories. For example, in a review of studies of amnesia following medial temporal lobe 
damage, Grilli and Verfaellie (2014) noted that roughly half of patients with isolated MTL 
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lesions (14 out of 26) had impaired memory for autobiographical facts. A similar proportion was 
observed for patients with lesions restricted to the hippocampus (7 impaired out of 15). Certain 
autobiographical facts and memories of repeated events may be experience-near and bound to 
unique episodic memories (Renoult, et al., 2015; Westmacott, Black, Freedman, & Moscovitch, 
2004; Westmacott & Moscovitch, 2003), while other may be more abstract and similar to general 
facts. One could thus argue that the observation that memories of autobiographical facts and 
repeated events were associated with intermediate modulations of N400 and LPC as compared to 
general facts and unique events, could be due to this heterogeneity. It will thus be important to 
measure phenomenological properties of individual memories such as their vividness (Sheldon & 
Levine, 2013) and associated subjective experience (Gardiner, 2001; Tulving, 1985) in future 
studies to control for this potential heterogeneity of personal semantics. 
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Figures 
Figure 1.  A continuum of abstraction in memory content. In this figure, two types of personal 
semantics are represented alongside semantic and episodic memory with a continuous color 
code, illustrating that, conceptually, they form a type of continuum of abstraction from the 
personal/contextually unique (unique events) to the general/acontextual (general facts). As 
discussed in Renoult et al. (2012), it is yet unknown whether this continuum is materialized in 
differential (graded) involvement of a common network of brain regions or in different sets of 
brain regions for the different types.   
 
Figure 2. Scalp location of the regions of interest (ROIs). Electrode sites were grouped into 5 
subsets: Prefrontal: Light red; Sagittal: Yellow; Posterior-parietal: Grey; Para-sagittal: Brown; 
Lateral: Blue.  
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Figure 3 Mean reaction times (RTs) and standard-error bars in the 4 experimental conditions (in 
ms). GF: General Facts, AF: Autobiographical Facts, RE: Repeated Events; UE: Unique Events.   
 
Figure 4. Grand average ERPs (N=27) to the final words of the sentences (for “yes” responses). 
ERPs were averaged across the electrodes of the prefrontal (A), sagittal (B), posterior parietal 
(C), para-sagittal (D) and lateral (E) subsets. GF: General Facts, AF: Autobiographical Facts, 
RE: Repeated Events; UE: Unique Events. Negative voltage is plotted upwards. 
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Figure 5. Spline interpolated isovoltage maps for the condition “general facts” in the N400 time 
window (300-500). This map was obtained by subtracting the mean voltage of the grand mean 
ERPs evoked across the AF, RE and UE conditions from the mean voltage evoked in the GF 
condition. GF: General Facts, AF: Autobiographical Facts, RE: Repeated Events, UE: Unique 
Events.   
 
Figure 6. Spline interpolated isovoltage maps for the conditions “autobiographical facts” and 
“repeated events” in the N400 time window (300-500). Each map was obtained by subtracting 
the mean voltage of the grand mean ERPs evoked by the GF condition from those evoked in 
each condition (AF and RE). GF: General Facts, AF: Autobiographical Facts, RE: Repeated 
Events.   
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Figure 7 Grand average ERPs (N=27) to the final words of the sentences (for “yes” responses) 
showing some of the individual electrodes composing the sagittal (A), posterior parietal (B), and 
para-sagittal (C) subsets. GF: General Facts, AF: Autobiographical Facts, RE: Repeated Events; 
UE: Unique Events. Negative voltage is plotted upwards. 
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Figure 8. Grand average ERPs (N=27) to the final words of the sentences (for “yes” responses) 
showing some of the individual electrodes composing the lateral subset of electrodes. GF: 
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General Facts, AF: Autobiographical Facts, RE: Repeated Events; UE: Unique Events. Negative 
voltage is plotted upwards. 
 
Figure 9. Spline interpolated isovoltage maps for the condition “unique events” in the LPC time 
window (500-700). This map was obtained by subtracting the mean voltage of the grand mean 
ERPs evoked across the GF, AF, and RE conditions from the mean voltage evoked in the UE 
condition. GF: General Facts, AF: Autobiographical Facts, RE: Repeated Events, UE: Unique 
Events.   
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Figure 10. Spline interpolated isovoltage maps for the conditions “autobiographical facts” and 
“repeated events” in the LPC time window (500-700). Each map was obtained by subtracting the 
mean voltage of the grand mean ERPs evoked by the UE condition from those evoked in each 
condition (AF and RE). AF: Autobiographical Facts, RE: Repeated Events, UE: Unique Events.  
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Highlights  
 Autobiographical facts and repeated events are two types of personal semantics (PS) 
 Their neural correlates were compared to general facts and unique events using ERPs 
 N400 and LPC were used as ERP indexes of semantic and episodic retrieval, respectively 
 N400 and LPC distinguished both types of PS from general facts  
 N400 also differentiated autobiographical facts from unique events 
 
 
Appendix: List of sentences used in the four experimental conditions. The cue words are in italic. See 
“experimental tasks” in Methods for more details. 
ID General Facts                                                                    Autobiographical 
Facts 
Repeated Events Unique Events 
1 Everyone wears 
white socks? 
Usually I wear 
white socks? 
When shopping I have 
worn white socks? 
Yesterday I wore white socks? 
2 Most people take 
showers? 
Often I take 
showers? 
When at school I have 
taken a shower? 
Last night I took a shower? 
3 Few people use a 
computer? 
Very often I use a 
computer? 
When on the bus I have 
used a computer? 
Last night I used a computer? 
4 Some people skip 
breakfast? 
Usually I eat 
breakfast? 
When at school I have 
eaten breakfast? 
Today I ate breakfast? 
5 Few people make 
their bed? 
Every day I make 
my bed? 
When with friends I have 
made my bed? 
This morning I made my bed? 
6 Most people drive 
on the highway? 
Rarely I drive on a 
highway? 
When going to school I 
have driven on a 
highway? 
Last week-end I was on a highway? 
7 Most people eat 
fruits? 
Rarely I eat fruits? When shopping I have 
eaten a fruit? 
Today I ate a fruit? 
8 Few people read 
books? 
Rarely I read 
books? 
When on the bus I have 
read books? 
This week I read a book? 
9 No one eats at 
restaurants? 
Often I eat at 
restaurants? 
When at school I have 
eaten at a restaurant? 
This week I ate at a restaurant? 
10 Everyone watches 
TV? 
Very often I watch 
TV? 
When at work I have 
watched TV? 
Last night I watched tv? 
11 Few people go 
shopping? 
Very often I go 
shopping? 
When on vacation I have 
gone shopping? 
This week I went shopping? 
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12 Many people 
drink coffee? 
Every day I drink 
coffee? 
When shopping I have 
drunk coffee? 
This morning I drank coffee? 
13 Everyone talks on 
the phone? 
Very often I talk 
on the phone? 
When on the bus I have 
talked on the phone? 
Today I talked on the phone? 
14 Most people eat 
pizza? 
Every day I eat 
pizza? 
When shopping I have 
eaten pizza? 
Last night I ate pizza? 
15 Many people go 
to the movies? 
Sometimes I go to 
the movies? 
When alone I have gone 
to the movies? 
This week I went to the movies? 
16 Everyone reads 
newspaper? 
Rarely I read the 
newspaper? 
When with friends I have 
read a newspaper? 
Today I read a newspaper? 
17 No one spends 
money? 
Every day I spend 
money? 
When at work I have 
spent money? 
Today I spent money? 
18 Some people rent 
movies? 
Rarely I rent 
movies? 
When alone I have rented 
a movie? 
Last week-end I rented a movie? 
19 Most people read 
magazines? 
Often I read 
magazines? 
When with friends I have 
read a magazine? 
Yesterday I read a magazine? 
20 Most people 
listen to music? 
Often I listen to 
music? 
When at work I have 
listened to music? 
Today I listened to music? 
21 No one washes 
the dishes? 
Every day I wash 
the dishes? 
When at work I have 
washed dishes? 
Yesterday I washed dishes? 
22 Most people talk 
to family 
members? 
Often I talk to a 
family member? 
When going to school I 
have talked to a family 
member? 
This morning I talked to a family 
member? 
23 Most people wear 
jeans? 
Sometimes I wear 
jeans? 
When at work I have 
worn jeans? 
Yesterday I wore jeans? 
24 No one sleeps 
well? 
Usually I sleep 
well? 
When alone I have slept 
well? 
Last night I slept well? 
25 No one wakes up 
early? 
Usually I wake up 
early? 
When on vacation I have 
waken up early? 
This morning I woke up early? 
26 Everyone eats 
chicken? 
Sometimes I eat 
chicken? 
When at work I have 
eaten chicken? 
Yesterday I had chicken? 
27 Few people listen 
to the radio? 
Every day I listen 
to the radio? 
When going to school I 
have listened to the radio? 
Today I listened to the radio? 
28 Some people go 
to bed early? 
Usually I go to 
bed early? 
When with friends I have 
gone to bed early? 
Last night I went to bed early? 
29 No one takes 
naps? 
Often I take naps? When on the bus I have 
taken naps? 
Yesterday I took a nap? 
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30 Many people 
cook dinner? 
Rarely I cook 
dinner? 
When at school I have 
cooked dinner? 
Last night I cooked dinner? 
31 Few people 
dance? 
Often I go 
dancing? 
When alone I have gone 
dancing? 
Last week-end I went dancing? 
32 Everyone watches 
sports games? 
Often I watch 
sports games? 
When alone I have 
watched sports games? 
This week I watched a sports game? 
33 Everyone checks 
their email? 
Often I check my 
email? 
When on the bus I have 
checked my email? 
This morning I checked my email? 
34 Some people play 
with dogs? 
Rarely I play with 
dogs? 
When alone I have played 
with a dog? 
This week I played with a dog? 
35 No one buys 
CDs? 
Rarely I buy CDs? When on vacation I have 
bought CDs? 
This week I bought a CD? 
36 Many people eat 
fries? 
Rarely I eat fries? When on the bus I have 
eaten fries? 
This week I ate fries? 
37 No one goes to 
the mall? 
Often I go to the 
mall? 
When on vacation I have 
gone to the mall? 
Last week-end I went to the mall? 
38 Many people 
drink juice? 
Very often I drink 
juice? 
When at school I have 
drunk juice? 
This morning I drank juice? 
39 Some people go 
on walks? 
Sometimes I go on 
walks? 
When alone I have gone 
on a walk? 
Today I went on a walk? 
40 Some people eat 
candy? 
Rarely I eat 
candy? 
When at work I have 
eaten candy? 
Yesterday I ate candy? 
41 Few people go to 
the bank? 
Sometimes I go to 
the bank? 
When with friends I have 
gone to the bank? 
Yesterday I went to the bank? 
42 Most people play 
video games? 
Very often I play 
video games? 
When at school I have 
played a video game? 
Last week-end I played a video game? 
43 Some people 
work out? 
Very often I work 
out? 
When on vacation I have 
worked out? 
This week I worked out? 
44 Everyone does 
the laundry? 
Very often I do 
my laundry? 
When with friends I have 
done my laundry? 
Last week-end I did my laundry? 
45 Some people eat 
pancakes? 
Sometimes I eat 
pancakes? 
When with friends I have 
eaten pancakes? 
Last week-end I ate pancakes? 
46 Everyone logs on 
Facebook? 
Very often I log 
on Facebook? 
When at work I have 
logged on Facebook? 
Today I logged on Facebook? 
47 Some people send 
text messages? 
Every day I send 
text messages? 
When on the bus I have 
sent a text message? 
Yesterday I sent a text message? 
48 Some people eat Rarely I eat When at work I have This week I ate a sandwich? 
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sandwiches? sandwiches? eaten a sandwich? 
49 Many people hug 
friends? 
Sometimes I hug a 
friend? 
When on vacation I have 
hugged a friend? 
Last week-end I hugged a friend? 
50 Many people 
water plants? 
Often I water a 
plant? 
When on vacation I have 
watered a plant? 
Last week-end I watered a plant? 
51 No one sings 
tunes? 
Sometimes I sing 
a tune? 
When shopping I have 
sung a tune? 
Last night I sang a tune? 
52 Most people kiss 
each others? 
Every day I kiss 
somebody? 
When on vacation I have 
kissed somebody? 
This morning I kissed somebody? 
53 Everyone buys 
gifts? 
Rarely I buy gifts? When with friends I have 
bought a gift? 
Last week-end I bought a gift? 
54 Few people go to 
the gym? 
Sometimes I go to 
the gym? 
When at school I have 
been to the gym? 
Yesterday I went to the gym? 
55 No one misses 
meetings? 
Often I miss a 
meeting? 
When at work I have 
missed a meeting? 
Today I missed a meeting? 
56 Many people 
have a drink? 
Very often I have 
a drink? 
When alone I have had a 
drink? 
Last night I had a drink? 
57 Few people take 
pictures? 
Very often I take 
pictures? 
When shopping I have 
taken a picture? 
Yesterday I took a picture? 
58 Everyone goes to 
the pharmacy? 
Rarely I go to the 
pharmacy? 
When on vacation I have 
been to the pharmacy? 
Last week-end I went to a pharmacy? 
59 Few people pray? Sometimes I pray? When with friends I have 
prayed? 
This morning I prayed? 
60 Everyone hears 
jokes? 
Every day I hear 
jokes? 
When shopping I have 
heard jokes? 
Last night I heard a joke? 
61 Few people give 
to charity? 
Usually I give to 
charity? 
When shopping I have 
given to charity? 
This week I gave to a charity? 
62 Many people visit 
museums? 
Rarely I visit a 
museum? 
When with friends I have 
visited a museum? 
Last week-end I visited a museum? 
63 Many people take 
a course? 
Every day I take a 
course? 
When on vacation I have 
taken a course? 
Yesterday I took a course? 
64 Many people 
have a cold? 
Rarely I have a 
cold? 
When on vacation I have 
had a cold? 
Last week-end I had a cold? 
65 No one goes 
swimming? 
Sometimes I go 
swimming? 
When at work I have gone 
swimming? 
This week I went swimming? 
66 Few people check 
the news online? 
Every day I check 
the news online? 
When at school I have 
checked the news online? 
Today I checked the news online? 
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67 Most people drive 
their car? 
Very often I drive 
my car? 
When going to school I 
have driven my car? 
Last night I drove a car? 
 
 
 
